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the Commission's outreach offices in Los
he California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was
Angeles and San Diego, provide procedural information and ad
created in 1 9 1 1 to regulate privately-owned utilities
vice to individuals and groups who want to participate in formal
and ensure reasonable rates and service for the public.
PUC proceedings. Under Public Utilities Code section 309.5,
Today, under the Public Utilities Act of 1 95 1 , Public Utilities
Code section 201 et seq. , the PUC regulates more than 470
the Office of Ratepayer Advocates independently represents the
privately-owned and operated gas, electric, telephone, water,
interests of all public utility customers and subscribers in Com
sewer, steam, and pipeline utilities, as well as 4,300 truck,
mission proceedings in order to obtain "the lowest possible rate
bus, railroad, light rail, ferry, and other transportation com
for service consistent with reliable and safe service levels." The
panies in California. The Commission grants operating au
Strategic Planning Division analyzes emerging policy issues and
thority, regulates service standards, and monitors utility op
changes in the regulatory environment caused by economic, fi
erations for safety.
nancial, institutional, and technological trends, and helps the
It is the duty of the Commission to see that the public
Commission to plan future policy.
receives adequate services at rates which are fair and reasonMembers of the Commission currently include PUC Presi
• able both to customers and utility shareholders. Overseeing
dent Richard A. Bilas and Commissioners Jessie J. Knight,
this effort are five commissioners appointed by the Governor
Henry M. Duque, Josiah L. Neeper, and P. Gregory Conlon.
with Senate approval. The commissioners serve six-year stag
The terms ofCommissioners Knight and Conlon expire in early
gered terms.
1 999; Governor Gray Davis will appoint their successors.
The Commission has quasi-legislative authority in that it
Maj or Proj ects
establishes and enforces administrative regulations, some of
which are codified in Chapter 1 , Title 20 of the California Code
Power Utility Regulation
of Regulations (CCR). The Commission also has quasi-judi
cial authority; like a court, it may take testimony, subpoena
The PUC continues to implement its novel and contro
witnesses and records, and issue decisions and orders. The
versial December 1 995 decision to restructure and substan
PUC's Administrative Law Judge (AU) Division supports the
tially deregulate California's $23 billion electricity industry.
Commission's decisionmaking process; PUCALJs preside over
[15:4 CRLR 234-37]
evidentiary and other types of hearings and forward recom
♦ Electric Power Deregulation: Summary ofHistory and
mended decisions to the Commission, which makes all final
Status. Generally, utility regulation is based on the need to
policy, procedural, and other decisions. In its decisionmaking,
control abuses which flow from unfettered monopoly power.
the Commission attempts to balance the public interest and
Some enterprises are "natural monopolies," meaning that there
need for reliable, safe utility services at reasonable rates with
is room for only one entrepreneur or physical plant to function
the need to ensure that utilities operate efficiently, remain fi
efficiently. Such natural monopolies normally exist in indus
nancially viable, and provide stockholders with an opportutries with high initial "threshold capital costs," such as electric
nity to earn a fair return on their
power delivery. The high fixed
. .. . .• . .
investment. The PUC encourages
costs involved in the distribution
ratepayers, utilities, consumer, and TtH!I; Pl,J� continµe$to jrnplernent. its novel
systems (e.g., rights of way, wir
industry organizations to partici and controversial Decerilber 1 995 decision
ing switching, and boosters) do not
t(>. restructure and substantlally deregulate
pate in its proceedings.
allow for a competitor to operate
$2.3 billion electridty industry.
PUC staff-which include California's
.
efficiently. A second enterprise
: �,.
economists, engineers, ALJs, ac
stringing a competing and dupli
countants, attorneys, administrative
cative distribution system simply
and clerical support staff, and safety and transportation special
reduces both such systems to 50% or less utilization, raises
ists-are organized into twelve major division and offices, in
average costs for each, and increases consumer prices due to
cluding industry-specific divisions addressing energy, telecom
the inefficiency. However, economists have argued that it is
munications, rail safety and carriers, and water. The
possible to isolate the monopoly power part of a utility and
Commission's Consumer Services Division attempts to resolve
subject its remaining components to competition. In telecom
consumer complaints regarding utility service, safety, and bill
munications, that restructuring has led to competition in long
ing problems; its various branches provide consumers with in
distance, toll call, and even local service. In electricity, the
formation, analysis, conflict resolution, and advocacy services
PUC's December 1995 restructuring decision has led to com
to help them make intelligent decisions about utility purchases.
petition in power generation, with the monopoly confined to
The San Francisco-based Public Advisor's Office, together with
the delivery system itself.
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Hence, the concept behind the PUC's electric utility de
regulation is to isolate the unavoidable power distribution grid,
regulate it as a natural monopoly, but open power genera
tion-where a wide variety of sources now exist without
natural monopoly features-to competition. Although con
ceptually advantageous, the practical difficulties flowing from
such deregulation include the following:
(1) where the entity owning the remaining monopoly
power part also operates power generating facilities, it will
favor its own power generation in its distribution;
(2) rate regulation imposed on a monopoly enterprise
allows a regulator to finetune rates to adjust for marketplace
flaws (e.g., pollution harm) or for socially beneficial cross
subsidies (e.g. , lower rates for the impoverished, special fea
tures for the disabled, stimulation of universal access); and
(3) new competition in a major industry can raise the
spectrum of traditional unfair competition, including mislead
ing advertising and promotional excesses, which requires
continued monitoring.
In its decision and through implementing legislation, the
PUC has adopted a number of regulatory strategies to address
some of these problems in electricity deregulation, including
in particular the use of an "independent system operator" (ISO)
to control an independent power exchange (IPE or "PX"). The
concept here is to separate the buying and selling of power
from the existing utility-which necessarily retains control over
the distribution system. This separation gives sources of power
generation, now subject to competition, a chance to sell power
to the "grid" on a non-discriminatory basis. The alternative
strategy favored by most consumer activists would confine
existing utilities to distribution alone, and force them to sell
their power generation assets. Consumer critics contend that
retention of power generation assets by the utilities encour
ages a conflict of interest-based motivation to favor their own
power generation, and leaves them with a continuing incentive
to use nuclear power or other forms of non-economic or envi
ronmentally dangerous power. Alternatively, where those as
sets are subject to competitive pressure, they seek "bailout"
recovery for lost asset value, which normal utility rate regula
tion may or may not allow.
The PUC's December 1995 restructuring plan was sub
ject to approval and authorization by the Federal Energy Regu
latory Commission (FERC), and required state legislation to
restructure the industry. In 1996, the legislature enacted AB
1890 (Brulte) (Chapter 854, Statutes of 1996), which autho
rized the creation of an ISO system and made other changes
relevant to some of the concerns outlined above. The bill cre
ated a five-member Oversight Board to supervise the ISO and
the PX, and to appoint governing boards for each that are
"broadly representative of California electricity users and pro
viders"; the Oversight Board consists of three gubernatorial
appointees subject to Senate confirmation and two non-voting
legislators. The bill authorizes "direct access"-direct trans
actions can occur between electricity suppliers and end use
customers without effective interference from the utility car
rying the electricity. AB 1890 also outlined the general plan to
accomplish the "unbundling," or separation, of the three dis-

tinct functions of electricity service: (1) generation, (2) trans
mission, and (3) distribution (including an unbundling of main
tenance of electricity lines, metering, and billing).
In one of its more controversial features, AB 1890 also
authorized the collection of nonbypassable "transition costs"
from ratepayers, defined as the "stranded" or "sunk" costs of
utility powerplants and power purchase contracts that cannot
be recovered in a competitive generation market (see below).
To sweeten the deal for consumers, the bill required a rate freeze
from June 10, 1996 through December 3 1, 1996, and then a
10% rate reduction for residential and small commercial
ratepayers by January 1, 1998; the bill also requires the Com
mission to cut rates an additional 10% by June 30, 2002. To
finance the rate reductions, AB 1890 authorized the issuance
of up to $10 billion in bonds by the power companies. The bill
also stated the intent of the legislature to protect consumers by
requiring registration of certain sellers, marketers, and
aggregators of electricity service; requiring information on the
new restructuring scheme to be provided to consumers; pro
viding for the compilation and investigation of complaints; and
continuing to fund low-income ratepayer assistance and other
public purpose programs in an unbundled manner.
The detailed implementation of AB 1890 was subject to
PUC rulemaking and subsequent refining legislation. The gen
eral timeline set forth by the statute began with the designation
of the ISO no later than March 3 1, 1997. The phase-in period
for direct transactions between independent electricity provid
ers and end use customers was to begin no later than January 1,
1998, and is to be completed no later than January 1 , 2002.
The "transition costs" will be collected from ratepayers until
December 3 1, 2001 (with several exceptions, including ex
tended recovery of non-economic costs for the San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station until December 3 1 , 2003).
On December 22, 1997, the ISO Governing Board and
the PX Governing Board announced a delay in their assump
tion of transmission control. On December 30, 1997, in PUC
Decision 97-12-13 1, the Commission acknowledged the ne
cessity of the delay and preserved most of the status quo (e.g.,
the rate freeze, the 10% rate reduction, and the consumer edu
cation provisions of the initial plan) pending start-up.
On March 3 1, 1998, the PX became operational, and di
rect service began to residential and small commercial end
users. Currently, more than thirty electric service providers
(ESPs) are actively registered with the PUC. An updated list
of ESPs, as well as other consumer infonnation, may be found
at the PUC's website at www.cpuc.ca.gov.
• Deregulation Problems-Stranded Costs. As noted
above, in a competitive market, utilities would not be able to
recover their investments in nuclear generation and other fa
cilities that produce energy at above market prices. Even un
der standard utility rate regulation doctrine, such uneconomic
compensation would be limited. Although utility sharehold
ers have a constitutional right to a "fair rate of return" on
their investment, that right applies only to "prudent costs"
and to investments which are "used and useful" for ratepayers.
During the debate on AB 1890, the utilities argued that these
now uneconomic assets have sufficient historical merit as
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plaints of consumer activists, it included a number of new or
clarified consumer protections to overcome consumer group
opposition to the bonds . For example, although AB 1890 required ESPs s ervicing residential and small commercial
customers to "register" with the state prior to beginning operations only until January 1, 2002, this legislation extends
the registration requirement indefinitely, adds a $25,000 registration fee, and includes new requirements. Hence, although
power generation was to be subject to marketplace forcesparticularly as to pricing-a less onerous form of regulation
(registration, rather than licensing) is available for public protection against competition flaws or competitive abuses . The
legislation also requires the PUC to compile consumer information and make it available to the public, including fraudulent practice information. And, cognizant of the excesses in
"switch-to-me" long distance telecommunications marketing,
the bill requires the PUC to compile a "no-solicitation list" of
those customers who do not wish to be contacted by ESPs .
+PUCDecision 98-03-072. On March 26, 1998, the Commission adopted Decision 98--03--072 to implement further the
provisions of SB 477. The regulatory scheme adopted in Decision 98--03--072 strikes a balance between allowing ready access to the marketplace and filtering to prevent unsafe products or other irreparable harm to the public. It adopts interim
standards that ESPs must satisfy, consisting of three primary
+Deregulation Problems-Consumers to Finance Their
requirements: ( 1) as noted above, a regulatory registration requirement to screen retailers of electrical power to consumers,
Own Rate Reduction. As a concession to consumers during
including "proof of technical and operational ability" as well
the AB 1890 bargaining process, and to assuage public proas "proof of financial viability" pursuant to SB 477 and in actests over the new CTC charge, the law requires the utilities
cordance with Public Utilities Code section 394; (2) a bonding
to give consumers a 10% reduction in electricity rates from
requirement to protect consumers; and (3) a notice/informathose in effect on June 10, 1996. This rate reduction was eftion disclosure requirement applying to the service contract
fective January 1, 1998 and continues until the earlier of March
31, 2002, or such time as transi. ......... __ .. ... ...
___ ··-- .
.... . . __ _ _ . . and billing. The interim standards
tion costs have been fully recovare based on proposed standards
In other words, the rate reduction bonds are
and earlier actions taken by PUC
ered. However, the reduction was
Jec:ured by � . surch arge th at more than
accompanied by the issuance of
staff, and they were effective imoffsets the reduction itself.
"rate reduction bonds" by the utilimediately upon the publication of
�---- ·-----· ·--- ... ... . .... . · · · ...... .. _.. ......._. .._,
Decision 98--03--072 .
ties to finance it, and consumers
are required to pay the borrowed money back in another speThe registration requirement implements a form of regucially designated charge on their monthly bills (called the
lation allowing for greater competition, with the retention of
"trust transfer amount" or "TIA"). This latter charge-origis ome state intervention. Instead of comprehensive regulation,
including ratesetting, the registration process attempts to asnally authorized in AB 1890 and then fleshed out in SB 477
(Peace) (Chapter 275, Statutes of 1997)-is greater than the
certain qualification as a barrier to entry, followed by relavalue of the rate cut (due to interest accumulation). In other
tively relaxed regulatory involvement post-entry (with the
words, the rate reduction bonds are secured by a surcharge
exception of a limited bond requirement). Hence, at point of
that more than offsets the reduction itself. Many consumer
registration, a new service provider (for residential or small
groups, particularly the Proposition 103 Enforcement Project
commercial customers) must vouch for its ability by demond irected by Harvey Rosenfield, complained vocally, but the
strating experience in the energy field or related businesses,
legislature wasn't listening.
and proof of technical, operational, and financial ability. Pro• Electrical Service Deregulation-Consumer Protecviders seeking to register must wait 30 days while the PUC
tion Rules. In 1997, the legislature enacted SB 477 (Peace)
conducts a background check to verify the information beto refine AB 1890 and to redefine the rate reduction bonds
fore it will issue a registration number to the applicant.
authorized in AB 1890 (see above). SB 477's passage ocConsistent with SB 477, Decision 98--03--072 requires a
curred in the context of consumer d issatisfaction with utility
$25,000 security deposit, bond, or customer trust account as
well as an executed service agreement with each utility distribill manipulation and stranded cost consumer assessments
bution company (UDC) in whose service area the ESP intends
noted above. Although SB 477 did not address the underlyto offer service. The notice requirement to customers consist
ing stranded cost problem, bill manipulation, or other com-

''used and useful" assets, and that they are entitled to a full fair
market recovery on them even though they are now of limited
value. Hence, the utilities argued that they should be compensated for these "stranded costs," also called "transition costs" or
"sunk investments." As noted above, AB 1890 permits the utilities to assess a special charge to pay for these "transition costs,"
estimated at $28 billion. This ratepayer assessment was given
the special name "Competition Transition Cost" (CTC) and part
of it appears as a special charge on utility bills. Several 1998
attempts to invalidate this controversial charge on ratepayers were
defeated in the legislature (see LEGISLATION).
Further, the bill allows utilities to freeze electricity rates
for residential and small business users at recent high levels
(about 50% above the national average). Consumer critics note
that the "freeze" here ordered is not a consumer benefit, as it
was with insurance reform efforts or in areas where prices normally rise over time. With electricity deregulation, substantial
cost reductions will occur-including the acquisition of power
at lowest cost, rather than at the cost incurred by the utility 's
choice of power generation. Hence, the freeze allows the utility to keep those cost savings for itself. In other words, maintenance of rates at levels extant when a utility 's own inefficient
power generation mix determined costs allows it to assure stable
and continuing profit levels notwithstanding the exposure of
its generation operation as inefficient and costly.
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of a "Notice of Price, Terms, and Conditions of Service." The
PUC suggests specific form wording to assure that the notice
is uniform for all providers and to enable consumers to easily
compare prices and services. And utilities and ESPs will use a
standard bill format so that no matter who serves a customer,
the bill will include the same minimum body of information,
in itemized detail to allow customer monitoring.
Decision 98-03-072 also requires the PUC's Consumer
Services Division to track customer complaints about ESPs.
A broad array of information about complaints and PUC re
sponse must be made available to the public on the PUC's
website. Unauthorized switching of providers is explicitly
prohibited. The PUC has established a cost recovery remedy
to provide a financial incentive against "slamming"
(unconsented transfer of customers), as well as an immediate
suspension capability as a punitive measure.
♦ Voters Defeat Proposition 9. Frustrated by the
legislature's restructuring of AB 1 890's rate reduction bonds
to require consumers to repay them, several consumer groups
qualified Proposition 9 for the November 1998 ballot. The
initiative would have answered the complaints against the
controversial surcharges of AB 1 890 and SB 477 with a plan
to: ( 1 ) prohibit private electric utilities from charging
ratepayers for transition costs for the nuclear powerplants
(other than reasonable decommissioning costs); (2) prohibit
the TTA charge to finance the rate reduction bonds; and (3)
mandate a 20% rate reduction in electric rates. These pro
posed measures were intended to block what consumer ad
vocates contended was a shameless financial bailout of utili
ties in order to buy their support for deregulation and the sys
tem advantages flowing from enhanced competition.
On November 3, 1 998, California voters defeated Propo
sition 9 by a three-to-one margin. Harvey Rosenfield, co-au
thor of Proposition 9, complained that the media campaign
against Proposition 9 cost an extraordinary $40 million, al
most all of it coming from the state's three largest electric
utilities-Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison,
and San Diego Gas & Electric. The companies created an
organization called "Californians for Affordable and Reliable
Electric Services" (CARES) and funneled millions of dollars
in contributions timed in such a way as to escape public scru
tiny until it was too late. Rosenfield, Ralph Nader, and other
consumer activists charged that the utilities' anti-Proposition
9 advertisements were demonstrably false, relying on the "big
lie" technique of repetition without opportunity for rebuttal
or correction. The ads claimed that the initiative would im
pose "higher consumer bills" (when it would explicitly man
date lower bills) and paraded a series of dubious scenarios of
state credit diminution affecting local government bond fi
nancing, and the likelihood ofrequired state payment of bond
indebtedness notwithstanding the initiative's terms to the con
trary. The consumer activists' claims were bolstered by the
Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) analysis of the measure,
which concluded that the state would not be required to foot
the bill in the event of a bond default. The opinion carried
substantial weight given the legislative leadership's consis-

tent and strong support for the utilities' position. Consumer
activists also cited the different policies of other states now
deregulating utilities. Illinois' Commonwealth Edison wrote
off $1 .36 billion in the fourth quarter of 1997, absorbing losses
from unproductive power generation. Pennsylvania's utility,
PECO Energy, similarly wrote off $3 billion. California has
provided an extreme example of utility solicitude.
Had the initiative won enactment, it was scheduled for
court challenge by utilities, which were expected to argue that
it would violate both the legislature's promise to repay bonds
via the TTA surcharge discussed above, and a similar agree
ment with the state's Infrastructure and Economic Develop
ment Bank. Prior to the election, an appellate court declined to
bar the initiative from the ballot based on these and other argu
ments, consistent with judicial doctrine not to interfere in such
issues until and unless ripe. Consumer activists were prepared
to argue the merits of this contention, citing the prohibition on
any one legislature from binding future legislatures. Hence,
unless and to the extent that constitutional public "taking" limi
tations are involved, the public-acting as a subsequent legis
lature under the constitution-can refashion such terms in the
same way it can alter the Tax Code.
Funded almost entirely by the utilities who stood to gain
(and lose) the most, CARES outspent Proposition 9's propo
nents $40 million to $ 1 .4 million (including the $ 1 . 1 million
spent to qualify the initiative). The scale of the utility cam
paign was substantial; the two gubernatorial candidates
combined-spent $50 million.
Some consumer activists contend that notwithstanding
some first amendment application to utility-sponsored speech,
large-scale public deceit should invoke PUC intervention and
sanction. None has occurred. Consumer activists charge that
instead of enforcing minimum ethical standards of honesty, the
PUC and other state agencies joined in the deception. Weeks
before the election, the California Energy Commission (CEC)
prepared an analysis showing that Proposition 9 would have
dramatically reduced rates for 10 million Californians. The
report was finalized on October 16, 1 998, but was not released
by the CEC until the week of November 16, two weeks after
the November 3 election. The report stated that Proposition 9
would have reduced Californians' power bills by 1 1 %-1 8%,
contradicting the advertisements of the utility companies.
• The Impact of Deregulation on the Environment.
Some environmentalists have complained that AB 1890 pro
vides only half the money budgeted in 1 994 for energy-effi
cient programs-and that funding is limited to four years.
AB 1890 does include a so-called "green marketing" provi
sion, which encourages the use of electricity generated from
renewable resources. However, some environmental critics
contend that the restructuring plan makes "green market
ing" so difficult and unprofitable that only seven-tenths of
1 % of California's residential consumers have chosen en
ergy generation from environmentally sound suppliers. Nev
ertheless, the concessions by the utilities for environmen
tally sound energy subsidy which were obtained were sub
stantially greater than would have occurred with naked de
regulation. Moreover, they were negotiated by two major
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environmental groups, the Natural Resources Defense Coun
cil (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), in
the course of AB 1890's enactment. Both groups therefore
felt "honor-bound" to oppose Proposition 9, and did so.
Telecommunications Utility Regulation

The following is a description of recent PUC activity
related to its regulation of telecommunications in California.
• Commission Defers PacBeU's Application to Become a
LongDistance Carrier. On December 17, thePUC ruled against
Pacific Bell's so-called "section 271" request to become a long
distance carrier, giving the utility until June 1, 1999 to demon
strate that it meets the requirements of federal law.
Until 1996, PacBell-a Regional Bell Operating Com
pany (RBOC) born of the 1982 consent decree in United States
v. AT&T, in which AT&T agreed to divest itself of its local
operating companies-enjoyed a monopoly in local telephone
service but was prohibited by the final decree from entering
into the long distance ("interLATA") business. That year,
however, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (FTA) [ 15:4 CRLR 237]; Congress' stated intent was to
create an open and competitive telecommunications market,
including local markets. Hence, pursuant to AB 3606 (Moore)
(Chapter 1260, Statutes of 1994), the PUC implemented com
petition in the "intraLATA" toll call market on January 1,
1995, and expanded competition to the local market in 1996
to force incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs), such as
PacBell, to open their markets to competitors. [15:4 CRLR
238] Section 27 1 of the FTA permits RBOCs to enter the
long distance market, so long as they can prove they have
opened their respective local exchange markets to competi
tion. To meet this requirement, an RBOC must demonstrate
that it has complied with a 14-point "competitive checklist"
and that "the requested authorization is consistent with the
public interest, convenience, and necessity."
The FTA explicitly preempts any state or local regula
tion which impinges on the federal open competition goal.
Because of preemption, state public utilities commissions are
now subject to Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
guidance relating to most telecommunications regulation.
State PUCs have acted as local agents of the FCC when deal
ing with the local RBOC under acknowledged FCC jurisdic
tion. When a RBOC attempts to enter the long distance mar
ket, it does so by initially filing an application with the state
commission, which holds hearings to determine whether the
RBOC has satisfied the "checklist" and can be passed on to
the FCC for approval.
On March 3 1, 1998, PacBell filed for permission to provide
long distance service in California Because of the volume of
materials involved, PUC staff was unable to make a recommen
dation within the 90-day statutory period for initial investigation
and response. The Commission altered the application proce
dure to allow staff more time, and PacBell was granted a change
in the application hearing format. The new format included a
series of workshops in which all involved parties (competitors,
public interest groups, and staff) met and discussed ways in which
PacBell could meet the section 271 checklist requirements.
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The PUC staff's final report, issued on October 5, 1998,
identifies deficiencies that PacBell must correct before it can
expect PUC endorsement of a long distance filing before the
FCC. In November, PUC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Jacqueline Reed considered the report, and drafted a deci
sion with a final list of recommended compliance actions.
On December 17, the Commission issued a decision find
ing that PacBell has not yet fully opened its local market to
competition. According to the PUC, PacBell has complied
with only four of the required fourteen points on the statutory
checklist; the Commission gave PacBell until June 1, 1999 to
comply with the remaining ten requirements and submit proof
of its compliance. Failure to meet all fourteen points at that
point will mean that PacBell must refile its section 27 1 appli
cation and begin the process anew.
• PUC Fines PacBell Over Missing ISDN Data. On
September 17, the PUC fined PacBell $309,000 for failing to
produce customer survey data about the quality of its Inte
grated Services Digital Network (ISDN), or high-speed data
transmission lines, during 1997, and then failing to offer up
witnesses who could explain the omission.
In March 1997, the PUC granted PacBell rate increases
it requested for ISDN services, and also ordered the utility to
submit customer satisfaction survey results every six months
and to offer billing credits to certain ISDN customers to make
up for poor service. The utility failed to produce its survey
data for a I 03-day period between September 1 and Decem
ber 12, 1997, and then provided witnesses who could not ex
plain why they were not filed. When PacBell finally did pro
duce survey results for the April-September 1997 period, they
showed a marked deterioration in ISDN service quality be
ginning in March 1997 (coincidentally corresponding in time
to the PUC rate increase). Monthly statistics showed PacBell
failed to meet the standards set by the PUC in every month
and in every category except one (47 out of 48 possible points
of compliance) during 1997-98.
In addition to the $3,000-per-day fine, the Commission
ordered PacBell to absorb installation costs if, during any con
secutive three months through December 3 1, 1999, more than
10% of residential and business customers report that PacBell's
provision and repair of ISDN service is "poor" or "terrible."
• PUC Permits PacBell to Offer Anonymous Call Re
jection. On September 19, PacBell began offering Anony
mous Call Rejection (ACR), following the PUC's June 19
approval of its request to offer the service; the Commission
provisionally approved ACR for two years under strict pri
vacy safeguards.
ACR rejects incoming calls from callers who block their
number from being disclosed through Caller ID, another ser
vice offered by PacBell. If a call is blocked, a recorded mes
sage informs callers that in order to complete the call, they
must disclose their number by dialing *82 (or 1182 from a
rotary phone). ACR will be available free to Caller ID sub
scribers who pay $6.50 per month for the service, and at $2
per month to non-Caller ID subscribers.
PacBell has been offering Caller ID for two years. The
utility insists that Caller ID protects subscribers' personal
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tional customers are hooked in, even if their contribution is
privacy by enabling them to screen calls before answering them.
only up to the marginal costs they impose. However, as noted
Privacy advocates, such as the Privacy Rights Oearinghouse
above with electricity deregulation, the relegation of pricing
(PRC) based at the Utility Consumers' Action Network in San
to market forces makes this pricing format uncertain. Utili
Diego, warn consumers that Caller ID permits their telephone
ties often select other beneficiaries for marginal cost pricing
numbers to be displayed to, captured, and sold by telemarketing
advantage (e.g., attraction of new business customers, or com
firms and other commercial entities to whom consumers make
petitive response). [15:4 CRLR 1)
calls. The PRC advises consumers to block display of their num
The modifications to be considered would update the
ber to preserve their privacy. The PRC opposed ACR as well,
1984 GO 1 53 (which defines the procedures for administer
arguing that businesses will use ACR to force consumers to di
vulge private telephone numbers-which will then be used in
ing the program) to reflect ULTS program changes, make
ULTS conform to similar federal programs, foster competi
marketing schemes. SB 1070 (Peace), which would have pre
tion in providing ULTS, and require telecommunications pro
vented PacBell from offering ACR to businesses for this very
reason, was vetoed by Governor Wilson (see LEGISLATION).
viders to follow uniform ULTS procedures.
This rulemaking stems from changes in the federal LifeThe PRC also expressed concern that consumers will not
.
be given enough information to be
· ·· . _ .. . -·· . .. . ... .. . line and Link Up universal service
programs. Also, ULTS has not kept
able to use the feature to their ad
Privacy advocates, such as the Privacy Rights
vantage. In response to these con
pace with emerging competition in
Clearinghouse (PRC) based at the Utility
cerns, the PUC has required
the local phone service market be
Consumen• Action Network in San Diego,
PacBell to report monthly during
cause installation charges are not
warn consumers that Caller ID permits their
discounted for ULTS customers
the 24-month trial period on such
" teleph one ' numbers to b e displayed t o, who switch from a local phone com
factors as consumer response to
captured, and sold by telemarketing firms
the service, number of complaints,
pany to a competitor. This may dis
I . and other commercial · entities to whom
number of subscribers, and num
courage customers from choosing
consumers make calls.
ber of rejected calls per month.
among competing local phone ser-· --·-·---· ~·· -· · ·
Finally, before it can launch ACR '----- -----vice providers. And because there
service permanently, the company must assure the Commission
are no uniform standards governing compliance with the ULTS
that it has the technical ability and system in place to provide
program, program administration is becoming burdensome.
rejected callers an immediate recorded response, without in any
Modifying California's ULTS program to conform to fed
way degrading overall network operations.
eral standards will enable ULTS customers to get discounted
+Modification of Universal Lifeline Telephone Service
installation charges whenever they move to different residences.
Program. On September 3 , 1 998, the PUC opened a
It will also give them the option of a deferred payment sched
rulemaking proceeding to consider modifying California's
ule for installation charges, enable them to receive toll calling
Universal Lifeline Telephone Service (ULTS) Program and
control services without charge, and prohibit disconnection of
General Order (GO) 1 53.
an ULTS customer for non-payment of toll charges. Other pro
The ULTS program was created to implement the 1 983
posed ULTS program modifications would enable all local
Moore Universal Telephone Service Act, which provides low
phone service providers to recover their costs of providing
income households with access to basic telephone service at
ULTS service to the extent they are not reimbursed from the
a discounted rate (generally 50% lower). The ULTS program
federal Lifeline and Link Up programs, and allow ULTS sub
cost is currently $245 million, and the program serves 3.1
scribers to pay discounted installation charges once per year
million subscribers. Local phone service companies recover
when switching ULTS providers. The uniform procedures pro
the costs of providing ULTS from rates paid by ULTS phone
posed in the rulemaking are intended to reduce ULTS program
administrative costs and ensure that all carriers are treated
customers, subsidies from federal universal service programs,
and subsidies from the ULTS program. ULTS program costs
equally and fairly. The proceeding is scheduled to be concluded
are funded by the ULTS surcharge all customers pay on their
with Commission action by September 1999.
intrastate charges.
• PacBeU Seeks Substantial Increase in Service Charges.
The goal of the ULTS program has been to increase the
In June 1998, PacBell applied to the PUC for rate increases on
access oflow-income households to basic phone service. The
several services which remain within PacBell's monopoly
program has traditionally offered basic telephone service to
power and the Commission's rate regulation purview. Under
impoverished consumers at or close to the "marginal cost" to
the proposed rate hikes, emergency interruption charges would
the utility. Hence, although business and other residential users
increase from $1 to $4; busy line verification from 50 cents to
pay the "fully distributed cost" which included contribution
$2; directory assistance from 25 cents to 50 cents, with an op
of roughly their proportionate share of fixed costs, low-in
tion to raise the rate to $ 1 . 1 O; calling card calls from 35 cents
come consumers do not. Economists justify such price varia
to 60 cents; collect and bill-to-third-number calls from 95 cents
tion as consistent with both market and efficiency models.
to $ 1 .60; person-to-person calls from $2.95 to $4; and inside
Quite apart from the social advantage of universal communi
wiring charges from 60 cents per month to $1 .50.
The PUC held public hearings on these proposed rate
cation among citizens, the system's efficiency may be en
increases in Fresno on November 1 1 and in San Jose on Nohanced by higher utilization of its fixed costs if these addi-

i·
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vember 12, and evidentiary hearings on December 6-7.
PacBell argued that no significant rate hikes for these ser
vices have been imposed for several years, and that they are
j ustified by labor cost increases. Consumer advocates coun
tered that the increasing use of technology should more than
offset increases in labor and that consumers should be given
a rate rollback. The evidence has gone to the ALJ, and-at
this writing-a proposed decision is expected in early 1999.
• Service Quality Standards for Telecommunications
Carriers. On June 19,1998, the PUC initiated a rulemaking
proceeding "to determine the types of service quality stan
dards that should be applicable to telecommunications carri
ers, what the applicable technical standards should be, what
means should be used to measure compliance with the stan
dards established, and whether these standards should apply
equally or at all to both dominant and non-dominant carri
ers." Although the PUC remains fully committed to its ongo
ing goal of opening all telecommunications markets to com
petition, and expressed hopes that competition will "ultimately
be the major driving force to ensure that high levels of ser
vice quality will prevail," it also wants to ensure "both in this
transitional period and in the long term that customers are
assured of certain minimal quality standards that all compet
ing carriers need to achieve."
The PUC's inquiry concerns the "minimal standards of
performance required of telecommunications companies" in
order to remain licensed, as set forth in General Order (GO)
133-B. GO 133-B was last revised in 1992, "prior to the dra
matic growth in consumer demand for additional telecom
munications services and lines to customers' premises, and
prior to all but the earliest stages of competition develop
ment." GO 133-B is applicable to all telephone utilities pro
viding service within California; these utilities compile ser
vice quality data on a monthly basis and report to the PUC on
a quarterly basis when any reporting unit does not meet the
specified service level criteria for any month. Some telephone
companies maintain tariff rules that allow customers to re
ceive a credit when service installation or repairs are not com
pleted as agreed; others-notably Pacific Bell-offer no such
credit or even a service guarantee to customers.
The Commission noted that the number of service qual
ity complaints regarding telephone service made to its staff
almost doubled between 1996 and 1997; for this same pe
riod, complaints relating to missed commitments increased
from 30 to 502, while complaints related to delayed installa
tions increased from 171 to 703. "It is the purpose of this
rulemaking to propose for comment a set of service quality
standards and compliance mechanisms intended to address
these and other service quality problems and set minimal stan
dards for all customers."
On July 14, 1998, the assigned ALJ agreed to requests
from consumer advocates and telephone companies to hold a
two-day workshop on the issues, and to extend the deadline
for briefs and comments. Several proposals have been sub
mitted to modify GO 133-B, but action is currently being
deferred until Governor Davis replaces with permanent ap
pointees the two vacancies among the five commissioners .
164

Implementation of SB 960 (Leonard)
The PUC continues to move forward with implementa
tion of SB 960 (Leonard) (Chapter 856, Statutes of 1996),
which became effective on January 1, 1998 . The legislation
primarily deals with the internal decisionmaking processes
within the PUC. The law is intended to involve PUC Com
miss ioners more in all aspec ts o f Commission
decisionmaking, including hearings, and to establish rules
governing ex parte communications between interested par
ties and Commission decisionmakers in PUC proceedings .
• Classification of Procedures and Ex Parte Commu
nication Rules. The new statute requires the Commission to
identify and classify each proceeding into one of three cat
egories: quasi-legislative, ratesetting, or adj udicatory. A Com
missioner must issue a "scoping" memo for each type of pro
c eeding and lay out a timetable for resolution of the matter.
However, the classification into one of these three types of
proceedings triggers different respective rules; most contro
versial among the differences are the propriety and regula
tion of ex parte communications .
An "ex parte" communication refers to a private message
to a public official from a person with some interest in a pro
ceeding which is the subject of the communication and in which
the official is involved. The PUC has a long history of ex parte
communication embarrassments, including the disclosed draft
ing of a critical Commission decision by utility lobbyists in
secret. [14:1 CRLR 166--67; 13:4 CRLR 203-04] In general,
the more adjudicatory-or court-like-a proceeding is con
s idered, the more limitations apply on such private communi
cations. Quasi-legislative functions (e.g., rulemaking) are given
wider latitude, consistent with the legislature's protective pos
ture toward private communications (lobbying) in its own op
erations . The limitations common on ex parte contacts range
from categorical prohibition (generally applicable to judges
unless all parties are present, and similar to the PUC's existing
rule applicable to its administrative law j udges), to allowable
contacts followed by timely disclosure of such contacts to other
interested parties (currently applicable to Commission mem
bers in adjudicative proceedings), to no limitations at all (as
with the state legislature).
Under SB 960, the PUC must classify each proceeding
into one of the three categories; that classification triggers
d iffering rules as to ex parte communications and other is
sues. Interestingly, the bill also requires the Commission to
establish regulations on ex parte communications on case
categorization issues (see below).
If a proceeding is classified as adjudicatory, Public Utili
ties Code section 1701.2 requires the assigned commissioner
or ALJ to hear the case as described in the scoping memo
(which must designate whether the assigned commissioner
or ALJ will preside in the case) . Ex parte communications
are prohibited in adjudication cases. Once the evidence has
been presented, the assigned commissioner or ALJ must pre
pare and file a decision setting forth findings, conclusions,
and recommendations . The decision must be filed with the
PUC and served on all parties to the action "without undue
delay" (no later than 60 days after the matter has been sub-
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mitted for decision). The decision of the assigned commis
sioner or AU will become the decision of the Commission if
no further action is taken within 30 days. Any interested party
may appeal the matter to the Commission, or the Commis
sion itself may initiate a review of the proposed decision on
any grounds. The Commission may meet in closed session to
consider the decision that is being appealed; however, the
vote on the proposed decision shall take place in a public
meeting and must be accompanied by an explanation. Adju
dication cases must be resolved within twelve months of ini
tiation unless the PUC makes findings w hy that deadline can
not be met and issues an order extending the deadline.
If the PUC classifies a proceeding as ratesetting, the
Commission will appoint an AU or a commissioner to be the
principal hearing officer. The principal hearing officer must
be present for more than one-half of the hearing days. A com
missioner must be present at closing argument. With regard
to ex parte communications, Public Utilities Code section
1701 .3(c) states: "Ex parte communications are prohibited in
ratesetting cases. However, oral ex parte communications may
be permitted at any time by any commissioner if all inter
ested parties are invited and given not less than three days'
notice. Written ex parte communications may be pennitted
by any party provided that copies of the communication are
transmitted to all parties on the same day. If an ex parte com
munication meeting is granted to any party, all other parties
shall also be granted individual ex parte meetings of a sub
stantially equal period of time and shall be sent a notice of
that authorization at the time that the request is granted. In no
event shall that notice be less than three days." Once the ex
parte contact period is ended, the PUC may meet in closed
session to consider the case.
Public Utilities Code section 1701.4 establishes the rules
for quasi-legislative proceedings, in which the PUC estab
lishes policy and effectuates rulemaking. SB 960 provides
that the Commission shall appoint a commissioner to hear
the case, and an ALJ to assist the commissioner. The assigned
commissioner must be present for all of the formal hearings.
In rulemaking proceedings, ex parte communications are per
mitted without any restrictions.
The bill also establishes procedures for removing PUC
AUs from cases where there is a potential conflict of interest
or where the AU has recently been a party to a case before
the PUC. In adjudicatory and ratesetting proceedings, SB 960
provides for unlimited peremptory challenges to the assign
ment of an AU who (1) has served in an advocacy position at
the Commission or has been employed by a regulated public
utility within the last twelve months; (2) has served in a rep
resentative capacity in the proceeding; or (3) has been a party
to the proceeding. Also, in a major change in adjudicatory
proceedings, SB 960 provides all parties a one-time peremp
tory challenge to the assignment of an ALJ.
In January 1997, the Commission established experimen
tal rules for implementing SB 960, prior to its effective date of
January 1, 1998. The Commission wanted some experience
operating under the new requirements of the bill before its ef
fective date in order to recommend appropriate refinements .

i

Also, the Commission was directed by SB 960 to make certain
reports to the legislature before the effective date of the bill,
and the Commission felt that some experience under the new
rules would enhance its ability to make effective recommen
dations to the legislature. On December 3, 1997, in Decision
97-12-043, the PUC issued its Opinion Adopting Final Rules
Implementing SB 960, codified as new Article 2 .5 of the
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. The PUC then
sent these rules to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for
inclusion in the California Code of Regulations.
Major provisions of the new rules include Rule 6, which
requires any person who files an application after January 1,
1998 to state in the application the proposed category for the
proceeding (adjudicatory, ratesetting, or quasi-legislative), the
need for a hearing, the issue to be c onsidered, and a proposed
schedule. Rule 6c states that a Commission order shall pre
liminarily determine the category and need for hearing, and
shall attach a preliminary scoping memo. If a proceeding fits
into more than one category, the Commission may determine
which category appears most suitable to the proceeding, and
may divide the subject matter of the proceeding into different
phases or one or more new proceedings.
Rule 7 implements the requirements of SB 960 regard
ing ex parte communications during the categorization pro
cess (see above). Rule 7 permits ex parte communications
during the categorization process, but requires that they be
reported (disclosed, as discussed above). Rule 7 also requires
that ex parte communications in a ratesetting proceeding must
be reported. Rule 7 .1 sets out the reporting requirements. An
original and seven copies of a "Notice of Ex Parte Communi
cation" must be filed with the Commission's San Francisco
Docket Office within three working days of the communica
tion. The notice must include the date, ti me, and location of
the communication; whether it was oral, written, or a combi
nation; the identities of the decisionmaker involved and the
person initiating the communication; and a description of the
interested person's communication and its content . These re
porting requirements apply to ex parte communications in
ratesetting and categorization proceedings. In adjudication
proceedings, the new rules go a step further, and apply the ex
parte communication prohibition to both ALJs and to com
missioners. In quasi-legislative proceedings, ex parte com
munications are permitted without restriction.
Rule 63.2 implements the provisions of SB 960 regarding
the automatic reassignment of ALJs in an adjudicatory pro
ceeding pursuant to a peremptory challenge. Rule 63.2(a) con
tains the form of the petition to be used to exercise this chal
lenge, and states that no party in an adjudicatory proceeding
will be permitted to make more than one petition for reassign
ment. Rule 63.3 implements the procedure for reassignment of
an AU for cause in a ratesetting or adj udicatory proceeding.
Petitions for reassignment for cause are not limited.
• Closed Meeting Changes. SB 960 exempts the PUC
from the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act's requirements in
limited cases-when the full Commission is acting on ap
peals of adj udicatory cases, and when it is discussing
ratesetting cases.
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Public Utilities Code section 1 701.2(c) allows the Com
mission to meet in a "closed hearing" to consider an appealed
decision in an adj udicatory proceeding. This provision was
implemented by Rule 8.2(g), which states (in relevant part)
that the Commission "may meet in closed session to consider
the decision of the presiding officer that is under appeal." Reso
lution AU-175, adopted February 4, 1 998, states that it is the
belief of the Commission that the tenn "hearing" in section
l 701.2(c) is equivalent to "session" as used in Rule 8.2(g).
In proceedings categorized as ratesetting, after a hearing
has been held and a decision has been proposed, Public Utili
ties Code section I 701 .3(c) states that the Commission may
establish a period during which no oral or written ex parte
communications are permitted, and may meet in closed ses
sion to consider the decision during that period, which shall
not exceed 1 4 days (subj ect to the disclosure requirements
discussed above). If the Commission decides to "hold" the
decision (for possible change), section I 701 .3(c) permits it
to accept ex parte communications during the first half of the
interval between the hold date and the date that the decision
is calendared for final decision. And, under section l 701 .3(c)
and Rule 8. l (d), the Commission may meet in closed session
for the second half of that interval. During its rulemaking
process on these regulations, utilities urged the Commission
to adopt a default rule for open deliberations in all ratesetting
proceedings. In Resolution AU-175 (February 4, 1 998), how
ever, the Commission provided that the default protocol will
be for closed deliberations in these proceedings, and that the
provision for quiet time be observed. The thrust of the
Commission 's arrangement is to retain the ability of com
missioners to communicate with interested parties (e.g., to
obtain collateral or explanatory information, or to test the
proposed terms of a decision) before finally meeting in closed
session to hammer out a final decision. However, consumer
advocates contend that such license opens the way for sub
stantial abuse of the administrative process. Given the sub
stantial resources of those traditionally benefitting from these
private conferences, they are already well-represented in ex
tensive hearing records, written briefs, and oral argument. In
ratesetting proceedings, utility representation is usually funded
involuntarily from ratepayers at substantial cost in terms of
legal counsel and particularly in tenns of expert witness use.
Critics contend that allowing private communication beyond
such formal proceedings, without opportunity for cross-ex
amination, undermines the integrity of the hearing and
factfinding process.
• Office of Ratepayer Advocates. SB 960 also revamps
the Division of Ratepayer Advocacy, a PUC entity that repre
sents the consumers in all significant cases before the Com
mission. Under SB 960, the Division is transfonned into the
Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA), and the ORA director
serves at the pleasure of the Governor, subject to Senate con
firmation. The new law also requires that the ORA's annual
budget be separately identified. Since its creation in the 1 980s,
the purpose of the ORA has been to provide an independent
voice for the consumer and a check on utility influence within
the agency. Both of these changes are intended to give the ORA
1 66

additional independence from the Commission so it may rep
resent consumer interests without fear of reprisal or sanction.

PUC Seeks Changes to Intervenor
Compensation Program

In April 1 998, the Commission approved Decision D.9804-059, which makes minor changes to its intervenor com
pensation rules (Article 1 8. 8). In addition, in recognition of
the fact that major changes to the program would require statu
tory change given their provision in existing law, the PUC
has suggested legislative amendments to broaden intervenor
participation in PUC proceedings. Under the changed proce
dures, the PUC will provide scoping memos to parties to in
fonn them of what issues will be covered and thus subj ect to
the recovery of intervenor compensation.
Under current law, an intervenor may be reasonably com
pensated for participation in Commission proceedings if the
intervenor 's contribution ( I ) does not duplicate other parties;
(2) is needed for a fair determination of the case; (3) causes a
financial hardship to the intervenor; and (4) makes a substan
tial contribution to the case. Restructuring of the utilities in
dustry towards a more competitive model has Jed utility com
panies to argue that new competition adequately protects con
sumers, given their ability to change companies when dissat
isfied with current rates or service. However, consumer ad
vocates, with current Commission support, contend that the
intervenor compensation program remains necessary, particu
larly given the transition difficulties in accomplishing com
petition, and given the incomplete application of competition
to both telecommunications and electricity and its continued
non-application to water supply.
The current intervenor compensation program has suf
fered from slow compensation to worthy intervenors. Cur
rently, intervenors are compensated after the Commission
makes its decision in a proceeding. [ 10: 1 CRLR 1J The Com
mission is inviting parties to propose legislative amendments
to pennit the use of an "optional track" in formal proceed
ings that would allow for periodic payments to an intervenor
during the course of the proceeding if the intervenor com
mits to a budget, and agrees that compensation will be capped
at the amount submitted in its Notice of Intent.
Currently, any compensation awarded to an intervenor is
paid by the utility involved in the proceeding. However, with
increased competition in the affected industries, many policy
and rulemaking proceedings will involve many utilities, and
often these utilities are represented through associations and
other representatives. The new order requires all utilities par
ticipating in such proceedings on their own, through a repre
sentative, or through an association to share in paying the com
pensation. The Commission directed its General Counsel to
prepare a recommendation for legislative changes to the inter
venor compensation governing statutes based on this decision.
PUC Requires Utilities to Prepare for Year 2000

Disruption of services provided by PUC-regulated tele
communications, energy, water, and transportation utilities
would adversely affect millions of Californians. It is crucial
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that computer software and hardware used by the regulated
industries properly recognize the year 2000. With this in mind,
the PUC has sent letters to the regulated utilities requesting
confirmation of their Year 2000 (Y2K) plan, preparation, and
timetable for readiness. In addition, on November 5, 1 998, the
Commission adopted Resolution M-4792, which requires utili
ties to certify that they are compliant by November 1 , 1 999,
and to develop contingency plans to address Y2K problems
that may develop in spite of their efforts. In order to prevent
undue public concern, the PUC intends to mount a consumer
education effort, informing the public about its efforts to over
come the Y2K problem, and to assure the public that contin
gency plans are in place in the event of service disruption.

In March 1 998, the PUC adopted its 1998 Business Plan,
which details the major objectives and strategies each PUC
division will pursue in the coming year. The plan focuses on
competition and consumers. In the competition area, the plan
places particular emphasis on introducing and facilitating
competition between former monopoly utilities and viable new
market participants. The Commission believes that by foster
ing such competition, consumers will have greater choice of
providers and obtain new or improved services, products, and
prices. In the area of consumer protection and services, the
plan focuses on educating consumers about changing utility
markets and how changes will affect them. The plan also pro
poses new complaint and dispute resolution methods to re
solve customer disputes, and promises prompt action to ad
dress illegal or abusive business practices or services.

PUC Adopts 1 998 Business Plan

The Commission's Consumer Protection Role
and Responsibilities

In March 1 998, PUC President Richard Bilas created a
task force to evaluate the Commission's consumer protection
role and responsibilities. Commissioner Josiah Neeper con
vened a Consumer Protection Roundtable on April 2 and, on
July 3 1 , Commission staff issued its report. The report states
that the Commission must recognize that consumer and mar
ket fraud can and will occur in the newly competitive mar
ketplace, and that the Commission has a responsibility to in
form consumers of their rights in this new environment.
In order to implement this responsibility, the Commission
will uses three primary tools: (1) setting policies and rules; (2)
enforcing those rules; and (3) educating consumers by provid
ing the public with accurate, unbiased, and timely informa
tion. The report identifies four challenges the PUC faces in
order to improve consumer protection. First, the Commission
must improve public intake and resolution of consumers' in
formal complaints by streamlining public access to the Com
mission, especially for non-English-speaking consumers. Sec
ond, the report states that the Commission must proactively
identify consumer problems and trends in consumer fraud and
take expeditious corrective action; the PUC plans to accom
plish this goal by better compilation and validation of customer
complaint data and the establishment of clearer protocols for
investigation and enforcement. Third, the report recommends

that the Commission streamline consumer protection rules for
competitive utility service providers by initiating rulemaking
that will establish a single set of minimum rules applicable to
all competitive service providers (see above for discussion of
minimum service standards for telecommunications providers).
Finally, the report urges the Commission to enhance and reor
ganize its public information function, outreach activities, and
consumer education efforts and to prominently display the
Commission's toll-free telephone numbers on the Commission's
website and public information documents.

Legislation

AB 1154 (Martinez),AB 2648 (Martinez}, and AB 2703
(Martinez) all would have limited ratepayers ' liability for
electrical utilities' uneconomic sunk costs of facilities, par
ticularly limiting liability for the uneconomic costs of nuclear
generation assets; under AB 1 890 (Brulte), these liabilities
are to be charged to various consumers as part of the compe
tition transition charge (CTC) (see MAJOR PROJECTS).
None of these bills passed in 1 998.
• AB 1154 (Martinez), as amended on January 8, would
have prohibited the inclusion of uneconomic sunk costs for
nuclear generation assets in the CTC, and deleted nuclear
generation assets and settlement costs from transition costs
that can be financed by rate reduction bonds. This bill died in
the Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee.
• AB 2684 (Martinez), as introduced on February 23,
would have required the uneconomic costs associated with
electric deregulation to be allocated in the same proportion
as the marginal cost of generation was recovered as of June
1 0, 1 996, as opposed to being allocated in substantially the
same proportion as similar uneconomic costs were recovered
as of June 1 0, 1 996, through the regulated retail rates of the
relevant electric utility. This bill would have also mandated
an additional 1 0% rate decrease for residential and small com
mercial customers of electrical corporations, and prohibited
the imposition of any tax, bond payment, surcharge, or other
assessment on any electrical customer to pay for the rate re
duction required by the bill. On April 20, this bill failed pas
sage at its second hearing in the Assembly Utilities and Com
merce Committee.
• AB 2703 (Martinez), would have created a "nuclear
stranded assets panel" which would determine what, if any,
uneconomic costs for nuclear generation plants and related
obligations and assets are to be paid for by the electric utility
customers, and the amounts. The bill would have required the
panel to develop criteria for allocating these amounts between
residential and small commercial customers and all other classes
of electric utility customers; and prohibited the uneconomic
costs for nuclear generation plants and related assets and obli
gations from being paid for by electric utility customers until
the panel has filed its determinations and criteria with the Com
mission. On April 20, this bill failed passage at its second hear
ing in the Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee.
AB 2728 (Martinez). Existing law requires electric utili
ties, prior to implementation of the CTC and in conjunction
with the PUC, to devise and implement a customer education
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program infonning customers of the changes to the electric
industry. As amended June 30, this bill would have ( l ) pro
hibited the Commission from funding an entity to educate or
infonn consumers about electric, gas, or telephone deregula
tion, if the entity has a pecuniary interest in that market; (2)
pennitted the Commission to obtain funding from specific
entities for consumer education and consumer infonnation
programs regarding electric, gas, or telephone deregulation;
and (3) pennitted the Commission to solicit competitive bids
using the procedures of the State Contract Act, to contract
with a neutral third party to assist in administering and devel
oping consumer education programs regarding electric, gas,
or telephone deregulation. The author contended that preclud
ing entities with a pecuniary interest from conducting educa
tional programs (and advertising their sponsorship thereof)
and requiring that such education is undertaken by entities
whose true goal is unbiased education will therefore ensure
that the consumer will receive a better educational product.
Utilities would have consequently been barred from "free
riding" their marketing efforts, and competitors would not
suffer a competitive disadvantage. This bill failed passage on
the Senate Floor on August 26.
AB 1158 (Martinez), as amended August 24, would have
made findings that as utilities prepare for competition, ser
vice quality may suffer; and that the PUC lacks an adequate
mechanism to track and deal with consumer complaints re
sulting from the loss of quality of services attributed to the
transition to a competitive market. This bill would have re
quired the Commission to investigate and report to the legis
lature, on or before December 3 1 , 1999, on the impact of
competition on the quality of services provided by telecom
munications, energy, and natural gas utilities. On August 30,
this bill failed passage on Senate Floor.
SB 1602 (Peace), as amended August 10, is an urgency
bill that imposes a moratorium on any further action by the
PUC to deregulate the natural gas industry. The bill permits
the PUC to investigate the restructuring of natural gas services,
but prohibits it-prior to January 1 , 2000--from enacting any
gas industry restructuring decisions and from enforcing any
natural gas restructuring decisions for core customers (resi
dential and small commercial users) adopted prior to the effec
tive date of this bill but after July 1, 1998. SB 1602 also re
quires the PUC to report to the legislature should it find addi
tional restructuring of the natural gas industry to be in the pub
lic interest. This bill provides the legislature with the opportu
nity to enact legislation authorizing the PUC to develop con
sumer protection regulations before the natural gas market for
core customers is opened. This bill was approved by the Gov
ernor on August 25 (Chapter 401 , Statutes of 1998).
AB 2461 (Campbell), as amended August 26, would have
created eight advisory boards to advise the Commission re
garding the implementation, development, and administration
of various public purpose programs relating to electric and tele
phone corporations, and to carry out the programs pursuant to
the Commission's direction, control, and approval. The bill
would also have created a fund for each advisory board in the
State Treasury, and required utilities to submit collected rev1 68

enues to the PUC for transfer to the Controller and credit to the
appropriate fund. According to the PUC, the overall revenues
collected for these programs exceeds $1 billion and that the
sum is expected to grow substantially in the next few years.
This bill was vetoed by the Governor on September 26.
In his veto message, the Governor stated that the bill would
transfer the duties and responsibilities for collecting various
surcharges and fees from the respective utility companies of
each program to the state. Furthennore, he stated that he has
sought to reduce the size of government by encouraging state
departments to privatize their functions, and that this bill is a
movement in the opposite direction because it would require
functions currently perfonned by private utilities to be per
fonned by state employees.
AB 1605 (Committee on Utilities and Commerce), as
amended August 12, is a technical bill that would have ( 1) elimi
nated obsolete provisions of the Public Utilities Code; (2) ex
tended peace officer authority to certain officials, including
investigators of the PUC's Consumer Services Division; (3)
earmarked funds to be transferred from the PUC's Reimburse
ment Account to the Public Utilities Ratepayer Advocate Fund
in order to cover a lack of funding for the Ratepayer Advocate
Fund in existing law; (4) authorized the Commission to direct
telephone companies to implement the Deaf and Disabled Tele
communications Program (DDTP), which is currently imple
mented by the Commission; and (5) made other related and
technical changes, including technical changes to the written
reporting requirement associated with ex parte communications
by a decisionmaker. Governor Wilson vetoed this bill on Sep
tember 26. In his veto message, the Governor acknowledged
that "AB 1605 is a technical bill of importance to the Public
Utilities Commission." However, he vetoed the bill because it
conflicts with AB 105 1 (Bordonaro) (see below) and because
it would interfere with the PUC's DDTP, which provides tele
communications devices to individuals who are deaf or hear
ing-impaired through a legislatively mandated surcharge ap
pearing monthly on each California ratepayer's telephone bill.
The Governor called on the legislature to reintroduce the bill
without its provisions affecting the DDTP.
AB 1051(Bordonaro) enhances the access of consum
ers to the PUC's DDTP, whereby telephone corporations pro
vide sound amplification devices, together with a single party
line, at no additional charge to the basic exchange rate to any
subscriber who is certified as being deaf or hearing-impaired
by a licensed physician, audiologist, or a qualified state
agency. Under this bill, a licensed hearing aid dispenser is
also authorized to certify the need of an individual to partici
pate in the program if the individual has been previously fit
ted with an amplification device by the dispenser and the dis
penser has the individual's hearing records on file prior to
certification. This bill was signed by the Governor on May
2 1 (Chapter 38, Statutes of 1 998).
AB 1096 (Martinez), as amended June 30, enhances ex
isting law which prohibits telephone corporations, or any per
son, firm or corporation representing a telephone corporation,
from changing a subscriber's telephone service without speci
fied verification (also known as "slamming"), and provides
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that any corporation that violates the verification procedures is
liable to the telephone corporation previously selected by the
subscriber in an amount equal to all charges paid by the
subscriber after the violation. AB 1096 additionally makes a
telephone corporation that violates the verification procedures
on or after January 1 , 1999, liable to the subscriber for an
overcharge penalty in an amount equal to 10% of all charges
billed the subscriber after the violation, and requires the
amount the amount to be credited to the subscriber's tele
phone bill. This bill was signed by the Governor on Septem
ber 20 (Chapter 67 1, Statutes of 1 998).
AB 284 (Baca), as amended August 17, also addresses
the practice of "slamming." This bill requires a telephone
corporation, in addition to complying with existing verifica
tion provisions, to mail to a residential telephone subscriber
by United States Postal Service a notice that the subscriber 's
telephone service provider has been changed; any telephone
corporation that violates those verification provisions must
credit to a subscriber any charges paid by the subscriber in
excess of the amount that the subscriber would have been
obligated to pay had the subscriber's telephone service not
been changed. The PUC is required to adopt regulations to
govern those credits . This bill was signed by the Governor on
September 20 (Chapter 672, Statutes of 1998).
AB 1127 (Knox), as amended July 24, expands existing
prohibitions on the sale or use of illegal telecommunications
equipment with the intent to avoid any lawful payment, and
requires courts-in the event that a person violates these pro
visions with the intent to avoid the payment of any lawful
charge for telecommunications service to a telecommunica
tions service provider-to order the person to pay restitution
to the telecommunications service provider. According to the
author, "each year cellular providers lose an estimated $ 1 00
million as a result of unauthorized use of cellular telephones
and equipment. This loss affects all of us, since stolen cellu
lar telephones and .. .identification information have become
the communications devices of choice for narcotics traffick
ers in California." This bill was signed by the Governor on
September 28 (Chapter 554, Statutes of 1 998).
AB 1937 (Campbell), as amended June 1 8, requires the
Commission-until January 1 , 2000--to submit to the legis
lature, on or before October 31 of each year, a report on tele
communications that includes the following: (a) the status of
competition in the telecommunications marketplace; (b) sig
nificant changes that have occurred in the telecommunica
tions marketplace in the previous year; (c) a review of any
statutes that might impede or discourage competition in, or
deregulation of, the telecommunications marketplace; and (d)
recommendations to the legislature on statutes that should be
amended, repealed, or enacted to enhance and reflect the com
petitive telecommunications environment or promote the or
derly deregulation of the telecommunications industry, or
both. This bill was s igned by the Governor on September 13
(Chapter 465, Statutes of 1998).
AB 1994 (Bowen), as amended August 20, this bill pre
scribes-effective July 1, 1 999-certain consumer disclosure
requirements w ith respect to the advertising and sale of pre-

paid calling cards and prepaid calling services . This bill was
signed by the Governor on September 23 (Chapter 802, Stat
utes of 1 998).
AB 1424 (Martinez), as amended March 23, amends the
Public Utilities Act to require entities offering the services of
telephone prepaid debit cards that are not certified by the
Commission to provide telephone service to register with
Commission; failure to register w ith the Commission is a
crime. This bill was s igned by the Governor on September 23
(Chapter 799, Statutes of 1 998).
AB 2134 (Escutia). Various federal and state laws have
been enacted to protect residential telephone subscribers' pri
vacy rights with respect to telephone solicitations; these rights
are described in various governmental publications, includ
ing the Federal Trade Commission's brochure entitled Straight
Talk About Telemarketing and the Federal Communications
Commission's publication entitled ConsumerNews: What You
Can Do About Unsolicited Telephone Marketing Calls and
Faxes . As amended June 22, this b ill requires telephone cor
porations to annually provide residential customers with in
formation on these privacy rights in their billing statements .
The bill also requires the publication of conspicuous notices
regarding these rights in the consumer information pages of
the local telephone directories distributed by telephone cor
porations . This bill was signed by the Governor on Septem
ber 1 3 (Chapter 473, Statutes of 1 998).
AB 2716 (Martinez), as amended June 25, revises the
notice and public input process and changes the transition
period involved in the creation of new area codes .
Area code establishment and creation was previously the
duty of Pacific Bell. Federal law has removed this duty from
PacBell and turned it over to a non-telephone company coor
dinator, eliminating the potential conflict of interest. The co
ordinator is responsible for creating the options for the new
area codes, including the establishment of area code bound
aries and timeframes. Ultimately, the PUC decides which area
code option is implemented.
Existing law requires a telephone corporation that estab
lishes a new area code to provide a transitional dialing period
of at least six months during which a number in a new area
code may be reached by dialing either the old area code or
the new area code. This bill deletes the s ix-month transitional
dialing period, and instead requires a provider that opens a
new area code to provide a transitional dialing period with no
time limit specified. The bill requires a provider, if prefix
codes are available subsequent to a transitional dialing pe
riod, to permit a caller, without charge, to reach a recorded
announcement that informs the caller of the new area code
when the existing area code is dialed. The bill makes the law
requiring a transitional dialing period, and the recorded an
nouncement subsequent to the transitional dialing period if
prefix codes are available, inoperative if an authorized fed
eral or state agency orders mandatory 1 0-digit dialing. The
bill also permits the PUC to order a transitional dialing pe
riod or recorded announcement when a new area code plan
requires IO-digit dialing. This bill was s igned by the Gover
nor on September 1 6 (Chapter 574, Statutes of 1 998).
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1041, Statutes of 1998).
AB 487 (Leach) exempts unlisted or unpublished tele
SB 405 (Peace), as amended August 6, establishes cus
phone numbers of customers which are made available to
tomer notice requirements when a telephone corporation sells
public entities only for public safety purposes (such as 911
its long distance customers to another telephone corporation.
and flood evacuation warning systems) from public inspec
The bill requires telephone servers to provide written notice
tion under the Public Records Act. This bill was signed by
to their customers prior to the transfer of accounts to a differ
the Governor on April 6 (Chapter 13, Statutes of 1998).
ent server. Specifically, this bill (1) requires the telephone
SB 1070 (Peace), as amended July 2, would have prohib
service provider that is exiting the market to provide their
ited telephone companies from offering Anonymous Call Re
customers with a written notice to include (a) a description of
jection to California businesses, such that customer calls would
the proposed transfer, (b) any fees that the customer will be
be rejected unless they agree to disclose their telephone number
liable for as a result of the transfer, (c) all applicable rates,
to the business. On September 30, Governor Wilson vetoed SB
I 070, stating that ACR "is a valuable tool for corporate custom
terms and conditions of the new service, and (d) a statement
ers who subscribe to a caller identification service and do not
notifying the customer of his/her right to transfer to another
wish to do business with callers who are not willing to disclose
telephone service provider; (2) requires that the telephone ser
their telephone numbers to the party they themselves are calling.
vice provider that is exiting the market establish a toll-free
In fact, the ability to block calls from certain potential customers
customer service telephone number to resolve customer ques
has become a matter of security for some businesses. While the
tions and complaints; and (3) specifies that the provisions of
intent of this bill is to protect Californians' privacy, I believe that
this bill do not apply when the telephone corporation has en
this bill represents an intrusion into the rights of business own
tered into a written contract with the customer, and when the
ers to make legitimate corporate decisions."
change in telephone corporation results in no rate increase
SB 2150 (Peace), as amended April 21, sets forth legisla
for the customer. This bill was signed by the Governor Sep
tive findings and declarations regarding telecommunication
tember 20 (Chapter 663, Statutes of 1998).
policies and requires the Commission, no later than January 1,
AB 1977 (Campbell), as amended June 18, streamlines
2000, to commence a proceeding to consider whether to estab
the PUC's enforcement of an existing law prohibiting tele
lish a new regulatory framework that does all of the following:
phone companies from providing telephone service to unli
(a) ensures that the public has universally available access to
censed household goods carriers. As Public Utilities Code
basic local exchange service; (b) applies appropriate rules to
section 5322 is currently implemented, PUC staff must se
all telecommunications service providers; and (c) encourages
cure a search warrant from a magistrate in order to obtain
the provision of advanced, high
subscriber information related to
speed digital telecommunications
telephone numbers advertised by
SB 779 (Calderon),as amendedAugust lS,
services to the public. This bill was
entities or individuals who appear
expands public access to PUC proceedings
signed by the Governor on August
to be offering services as unliand expands Judicial review of major PUC
5 (Chapter 266, Statutes of 1998).
censed household goods carriers.
decisions by both the California Supreme
SB 378 (Peace), as amended i
The subscriber information (i.e.,
al
and th cour :
August 21, establishes protections
name of provider, name of sub•
ts '.:.!_: ��-- _
_ ·· ---- ---------· scriber and location of service) is
intended to reduce the inclusion of
unauthorized charges on a telephone customer's bill, a prac
necessary to prepare documents required to obtain a
tice known as "cramming," which has recently been the sub
magistrate's order for the disconnection of phone services.
ject of increasing complaints to the PUC. Among other things,
This bill requires telephone companies and related entities,
SB 378 provides that only communications-related goods and
on demand and the order of a magistrate, to provide the Com
services may be displayed on a telephone bill until 2001. This
mission or an authorized official of the Commission, with
bill permits non-communications goods and services to be
access to the name and address of the subscriber to a tele
billed, within the same envelope, but on a separate bill; in this
phone number being used by an unlicenced household goods
manner a subscriber can clearly distinguish all charges. On Janu
carrier. This bill was signed by the Governor on August 24
ary 1, 2001, the limitations on what may be placed on a tele
(Chapter 36 1, Statutes of 1998).
phone bill become less stringent. From that date, SB 378 no
AB 1182 (Keeley), as amended August 24, requires the PUC,
in consultation with the California-American Water Company
longer distinguishes between communications and non-com
munications services; it only requires that products or services
(Cal-Am), the Department of Water Resources, and other af
placed on a telephone bill contain subscriber authorization.
fected interests, to prepare a prescribed long-term contingency
plan that the company would pursue if Cal-Am's proposed
This bill also attempts to reduce the incidence of "cram
Carmel River Dam and Reservoir project does not go forward.
ming" by requiring entities that produce charges on a tele
The bill effectively shifts the burden of preparing the contin
phone bill to comply with certain provisions. The entity must
gency plan from Cal-Am to the PUC. The bill was approved by
include in the bill a clear description of the item being charged
the Governor on September 23 (Chapter 797, Statutes of 1998).
and the amount they are charging. Furthermore, the billing
entity must include their name and telephone number in or
SB 779 (Calderon), as amended August 28, expands
der to provide subscribers a manner to resolve disputes. This
public access to PUC proceedings and expands judicial re
bill was signed by the Governor on September 30 (Chapter
view of major PUC decisions by both the California Supreme
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Court and the courts of appeals. Previous law exempted the
PUC from provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) relating to the adoption of regulations, the review of
regulations by OAL, and judicial review of regulations. This
bill subjects major PUC decisions to a 30-day public review
and comment period prior to being voted on by the Commis
sion. The bill also requires the PUC, by July 1, 1999, to pub
lish a large volume of information regarding Commission
proceedings, including agendas, agenda item documents, and
adopted decisions, on its Internet website. The bill appropri
ates $814,000 to implement the expanded Internet site. Fur
ther, the bill requires the Commission to adopt any changes to
its Rules of Practice and Procedure in accordance with APA
rulemaking procedures, including review and approval by OAL.
In the area of judicial review, SB 779 (Calderon) seeks
to conform judicial review of PUC decisions with judicial
review of other state agencies' decisions. Existing law autho
rizes judicial review of PUC adjudicatory proceedings to take
place in either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal, and
judicial review of all other decisions to take place only in the
Supreme Court. This bill authorizes courts of appeal to issue
a writ of review in PUC ratemaking and licensing cases. How
ever, the bill retains existing judicial review procedures af
fecting water corporations until January 1, 2001.
Finally, this bill extends indefinitely the provisions of SB
960 (Leonard), which became effective January 1, 1998 (see
MAJOR PROJECTS ). The provisions of that bill were sched
uled to be repealed on January 1, 2002. SB 779 was approved by
the Governor on September 26 (Chapter 886, Statutes of 1998).
SB 2008 (Kelley), as amended June 24, expands the au
thority of the PUC to hold closed sessions to deliberate on
the institution of proceedings, or disciplinary action, against
any person or entity under the jurisdiction of the Commis
sion. Prior law allowed such closed sessions only with regard
to "regulated utilities." The bill also permits the PUC's meet
ing agendas to describe in general terms the purpose of a
closed session, rather than to specifically identify the pro
ceeding or disciplinary action contemplated, if (1) specific
identification would jeopardize the Commission's ability to
effectuate service of process, or (2) specific identification
would fail to protect the entity being investigated. The PUC
sought this legislation to protect consumer interests and to
prevent respondents from avoiding the Commission's disci
plinary actions. This bill was signed by the Governor on July
20 (Chapter 2 10, Statutes of 1998).

Litigation

North Shuttle Service, Inc. v. California Public Utili
ties Commission, 61 Cal. App. 4th 386 (Oct. 2 1, 1998), is
the first appellate court decision reviewing an action of the
PUC , under new jurisdiction established in SB 1322
(Calderon) (Chapter 855, Statutes of 1996). The bill provides
that, generally, judicial review of PUC decisions may be
sought in either a court of appeal or the California Supreme
Court. Prior to SB 1322, only the California Supreme Court
had jurisdiction to review PUC decisions-and that review
was (and is) discretionary.

In North Shuttle Service, the First District Court of Ap
peal ruled on a request by petitioner North Shuttle Service to
stay the effect of a PUC ruling revoking its license. Noting
that the stay provisions in the Public Utilities Code were en
acted in 1911 and that "the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance for their application," the court found that the case
raises issues of first impression, and held that an airport shuttle
service regulated by the PUC must show more than a loss of
asset value and revenue in order to obtain a stay of the PUC's
decision to revoke the shuttle service's operating permit.
On May 7, 1998, after nine days of hearings before an
ALJ, the PUC issued a decision revoking North Shuttle
Service's permit to operate an airport shuttle service at San
Francisco Bay Area airports, and suspending North's right
to participate in regulated transportation for one year. North
then petitioned the PUC for a rehearing, and an automatic
60-day stay was granted. On September 17, the Commis
sion denied North's request for a rehearing. On October 5,
North filed a petition for writ of review in the First District
Court of Appeal, incorporating a motion for a stay of the
Commission's decision until the matter was resolved. The
motion merged an express request for a temporary stay pend
ing a decision of the court on a long-term stay under Public
Utilities Code section 1763, with an implied request for a
long-term stay pending final determination of its petition
under section 1762.
In ruling on North's request for a temporary stay, the
First District held that the shuttle carrier had not met its
statutory burden of demonstrating that irreparable injury
would result if a temporary stay were not granted. In its
motion, North had presented information that it would lose
$2,500-$4,000 of revenue each day that it could not oper
ate, and that its customers and employees would be harmed
by the stay. North also contended that the value of its 13
operating permits would be lost if the revocation were to
take effect. The court viewed this information as "some evi
dence" of the adverse effects of the license revocation, but
not as sufficient evidence to justify a temporary stay. The
court then reasoned that since North had not presented suf
ficient evidence to grant a temporary stay, it could summarily
deny the request for a long-term stay.
The court concluded that North had not presented enough
evidence of its overall financial condition to support its re
quest for a stay. The court started with the presumption that
some injury, loss, or damage is inherent in any adverse deci
sion by the PUC, and such loss might be irreversible. How
ever, the court held that such irreversible losses did not con
stitute "irreparable" damage to the company, as required by
both sections 1 762 and 1 763. In order to show irreparable
damage, North would have had to present the court with evi
dence that it could not counter the adverse effects of the li
cense revocation by relying on other financial resources, or
diverting its resources to unregulated business activities.

Future Meetings

The full Commission usually meets every other Thurs
day in San Francisco.
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